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Abstract
Game-theoretic models of learning are a powerful set of models that optimize
multi-objective architectures. Among these models are zero-sum architectures that
have inspired adversarial learning frameworks. An important shortcoming of these
zeros-sum architectures is that gradient-based training leads to weak convergence
and cyclic dynamics.
We propose a novel ‘follow the leader’ training algorithm for zeros-sum archi-
tectures that guarantees convergence to mixed Nash equilibrium without cyclic
behaviors. It is a special type of ‘follow the perturbed leader’ algorithm where
perturbations are the result of a neural mediating agent.
We validate our theoretical results by applying this training algorithm to games
with convex and non-convex loss as well as generative adversarial architectures.
Moreover, we customize the implementation of this algorithm for adversarial
imitation learning applications. At every step of the training, the mediator agent
perturbs the observations with generated codes. As a result of these mediating
codes, the proposed algorithm is also efficient for learning in environments with
various factors of variations. We validate our assertion by using a procedurally
generated game environment as well as synthetic data. Github implementation is
available here.
1 Introduction
A wide range of recent learning architectures expresses the learning formulation as a multi-objective
and game-theoretic problem. They are useful to build log-likelihood free deep generative models [1, 2],
learn disentangled representations [3, 4], learn adversarial imitation [5], learn complex behaviors
[6], incorporate hierarchical modeling to mitigate the reinforcement (RL) exploration issues [7–9],
formulate curiosity [10–12] and imagination objectives in RL [13], tighten the lower bound for
mutual information estimates [14], compute synthetic gradients [15], etc. However, the behavior of
the gradient-based methods of training in these architectures is even more complicated than those of
single objective ones. For example, [16, 17] show that gradient-based methods suffer from recurrent
dynamics, slow convergence and inability to measure convergence in zero-sum type games. The
existence of cyclic behavior necessitates a slow learning rate and convergence. [16] proposed a new
gradient-based method by utilizing the dynamics of Hamiltonian and Potential games.
The focus of our paper is on training adversarial architectures using regret minimization framework
[18–20]. Adversarial training using regret minimization framework also suffers from cyclic behaviors
[21, 17, 22, 23]. However, as we show in this paper, it provides a mathematically elegant framework
for designing novel training algorithms that avoid cyclic dynamics. Another difficulty of standard
regret minimization methods is that they fail in non-convex settings. To address the non-convexity
issue, [24] invokes an offline oracle to introduce random noise. We propose a novel algorithm to
address both of these issues. We show that a neural network mediator can remove the cyclic behaviors
by perturbing the dynamics of the game. Moreover, there is no need for convexity assumption in
our approach. The mediator perturbs the dynamic of the game by augmenting the observation of
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the players with so-called ‘correlated’ codes. The nature of such codes is related to the notion of
correlated equilibrium [25, 26] and similar to disentangled codes in [3, 4]. Thanks to these correlated
codes, the proposed method is also an efficient approach for learning in multi-modal and adaptive
environments.
2 Problem Formulation
2.1 Game Theoretical Preliminaries
PNE MNE CorEq CCE
Figure 1: Generalizations of pure Nash equilibria. ‘PNE’ stands for pure Nash equilibria; ‘MNE’ for mixed
Nash equilibria; ‘CorEq’ for correlated equilibria; and ‘No Regret (CCE)’ for coarse correlated equilibria.
Consider a zero-sum game between two players, agent pi and discriminator D with strategies φ ∈
Φ, ω ∈ Ω respectively. In a deep learning game, each player is a neural network with its parameters
as strategies. Let L(φ, ω) denote the loss of the game and µ ∈ 4 Φ × Ω be joint mixed strategy,
where4 and × denote the probability simplex and cartesian product respectively. Let us also define
the marginal mixed strategies µpi, µD. For example, µpi(φ) is the probability that an agent plays
strategy φ. A Nash equilibrium gets achieved when no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally.
If a Nash equilibrium gets achieved over the probability distributions of strategies, it is a mixed Nash
equilibrium (MNE). If one relaxes the assumptions on the equilibrium, other game-theoretic concepts
can be derived, as shown in Fig. 1. The least restrictive of these is known as coarse correlated
equilibria (CCE). It corresponds to the empirical distributions that arise from the repeated joint-play
by no-regret learners. An essential concept required for the development of our algorithm is correlated
equilibrium (CorEq) [25]. Computing CorEq amounts to solving a linear program. As a result, it
is computationally less expensive than computing NE, which amounts to computing a fixed point.
However, CorEq is concerned with joint mixed strategies (e.g µ(φ, ω)) which is and stronger and
more restrictive notion than CCE. We therefore first define a simpler notion of MCorEq. We are
particularly interested in its maximum entropic version similar to [27].
Marginal correlated equilibrium (MCorEq): Let upi(φ) = Eω∼µDL(φ, ω), uD(ω) =
−Eφ∼µpiL(φ, ω) be the marginal loss. Also let gD(k, kˆ) = uD[kˆ] − uD[k] and gpi(k, kˆ) =
upi[kˆ]− upi[k] be discriminator’s and agent’s marginal payoff gain for selecting strategy k instead of
kˆ. Marginal payoff g quantifies the motivation of the users to switch to other strategies. MCorEq
is then a marginal mixed strategy (µpi, µD) such that ∀(φ, φˆ),∀(ω, ωˆ), µpi(φ) > 0, µD(ω) > 0,
gpi(φ, φˆ) <= 0 and gD(ω, ωˆ) <= 0, i.e no user benefits (in the marginal loss sense) from switching
strategies.
MeMCorEq: It is the solution to the convex optimization problem of µ∗ = arg maxµ∈MCorEqH(µ)
where H is the entropy. It is therefore a convex optimization problem.
2.2 No-regret Learning
One gradient-based method of learning in games is no-external-regret learning. External regret
is the difference between the actual loss achieved and the smallest possible loss that could have
been achieved on the sequence of plays by playing a fixed action. For example in the context of
the aforementioned zero-sum game, the regret for pi and D is max
φ∈Φ
T−1∑
t=0
L(φt, ωt) − L(φ, ωt) and
min
ω∈Ω
T−1∑
t=0
L(φt, ωt)− L(φt, ω) respectively. Regret minimization algorithms ensure that long term
regret is sublinear in the number of time steps. It is known that the optimal minimax regret of zeros-
sum games is O(log(T )) [28, 29]. There are several classes of algorithms that can yield sub-linear
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(a) FTRL: small leaning rate (b) FTRL: large learning rate (c) FTPL (d) FTNPL
Figure 2: Training dynamic trajectories in example 1. x-axis and y-axis are φ[0] and ω[0] respectively.
‖µt − µt−1‖2 are encoded using colors to track convergence. Small values are blue and largest are red.
regret. One well-known class of no-regret learners is Follow The Regularized Leader (FTRL)[30]:
φt = arg min
∑
i<t
L(φi, ωi) + h(φi) ; ωt = arg max
∑
i<t
L(φi, ωi)− h(ωi) (1)
One common choice is `2 regularization h(θ) = ‖θ‖2 which we used in the following examples to
illustrate the problem visually. FTRL algorithms are not suitable for non-convex losses. To address
the non-convex optimization case, [24] proposed a follow the perturbed leader (FTPL) by choosing
h(θ) = σθ where σ ∼ (Exp(ζ)) is an exponential noise introduced by an oracle.
Weak convergence and cyclic dynamics Let hT = (µ0, ..., µT ) be the history of past strategies
when the game is played repeatedly up to time T and µt = (φt, ωt). It is known that that no-regret
dynamics weakly converge to MNE in zero-sum games [28, 31]. Weakly convergence implies that
time average of hT will converge to the MNE. Previous works relied on this weaker notion of
convergence for training adversarial networks [18]. However, this weaker notion can be misleading.
It is as meaningful as the statement that “moon converges to earth” instead of stating that the moon
follows a trajectory that has the earth as its center [32]. Weak convergence is also related to the
dynamics of FTRL in adversarial games which is known to exhibit recurrent dynamics [21]. This
cyclic behavior is common across all choices of regularizers h and learning rates. We also show in
the following example that weak convergence and cyclic behavior also hold true for the FTPL.
Example 1. Consider a specific type of zero-sum game known as matching Pennies game with
L(φ, ω) = φAωT with A =
[
1 −1
−1 1
]
. MNE is µ∗ = (0, 0) for this game.
Trajectories of FTRL training dynamic for this example is visualized in Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b. Note in
Fig. 2b, how a large learning rate leads to an even weaker convergence (in the sense defined above).
Fig. 2c shows that FTPL also exhibits recurrent dynamics. Aside from the weak convergence, another
implication of this cyclic behavior is the slow learning rate, as discussed in [16]. This is because
gradient-based algorithms do not follow the steepest path toward fixed points due to the ‘rotational
force’.
Non-convexity FTRL with `2 regularization does not converge in non-convex situations as shown in
the following example.
Example 2. Assume pi to have the same loss as in Ex. 1 but let the loss for D to be defined
ReLU(−φAωT ) where ReLU(x) = max(0, x). MNE stays the same µ∗ = (0, 0) but FTRL does not
converge to MNE as shown in Fig 3a. Unlike FTRL, FTPL weakly converges to MNE. We visualized
the learning trajectories of FTPL in 3b.
We present an approach that does not require convexity assumption and that converges (instead of
weak convergence) to MNE without cyclic behavior.
3 Follow the Neurally-Perturbed Leader
Another choice for regularizer h(θ) in FTRL is the entropy function H(θ). This choice of regularizer
leads to Multiplicative Weights (MW) algorithm [33].
Theorem 1. When a continuous time MW algorithm is applied to zero-sum game with a fully mixed
Nash equilibrium µ∗ = (µ∗D, µ
∗
pi), cross entropy between each evolving strategy µ(t) and the players’
3
(a) FTRL (b) FTPL (c) FTNPL with one code (d) FTNPL with two codes
Figure 3: Training dynamic trajectories in example 2. x-axis and y-axis are φ[0] and ω[0] respectively.
‖µt − µt−1‖2 are encoded using colors to track convergence. Small values are blue and largest are red.
mixed Nash equilibrium H(µ∗, µ) = −∑φ∈Φ µ∗pi(φ) lnµpi(φ) −∑ω∈Ω µ∗D(ω) lnµD(ω) remains
constant.
Proof. Various works including [34, 35] have shown that the continuous-time version of MW algorithm follows
a replicator dynamic [36] as is described by:
µ˙pi(φ)
µpi(φ)
= upi(φ)−
∑
φˆ∈Φ
µpi(φˆ)upi(φˆ) ;
µ˙D(ω)
µD(ω)
= uD(ω)−
∑
ωˆ∈Ω
µD(ωˆ)uD(ωˆ) (2)
where as before upi(φ), uD(ω) are the marginal loss and u˙ = dudt .
It suffices to take time derivative of cross entropy term and plug in Eq. 2 and note the zero-sum nature of the
game:
dH(µ∗, µ(t))
dt
= −
∑
φ
µ∗pi(φ)
µ˙pi(φ)
µpi(φ)
−
∑
ω
µ∗D(ω)
µ˙D(ω)
µD(ω)
=
−
∑
φ
µ∗pi(φ)[upi(φ)−
∑
φˆ∈Φ
µpi(φˆ)upi(φˆ)]−
∑
ω
µ∗D(ω)[uD(ω)−
∑
ωˆ∈Ω
µD(ωˆ)uD(ωˆ)] = 0
(3)
Lemma 2. Maximizing Nash entropy H(µ∗) implies convergence of MW to MNE is no longer weak.
Therefore no recurrent/cyclic dynamics exist.
Proof. The degree of weakness in convergence measures of FTRL can be quantified using KL divergence
DKL(µ
∗||µ). Since H(µ∗, µ) = H(µ∗) + DKL(µ∗||µ), and H(µ∗, µ) is constant from Theorem 1,
DKL(µ
∗||µ)→ 0 is equivalent to Maximizing Nash entropy H(µ∗).
Let us refer to trajectory of ∀µt that DKL(µ∗||µt) = k as KL orbit as visualized in Fig 4. Lemma
2 then builds a useful intuition on how to avoid the cyclic behavior and to guarantee convergence
(instead of weak convergence) to the MNE. By slowly maximizing H(µ∗), we can travel toward
MNE one KL orbit at a time, until we reach an orbit with radius 0, i.e DKL(µ∗||µt) = 0. At this
point, convergence is no longer weak and no recurrent dynamic exists. However, it is not feasible
to control H(µ∗) without interfering with the game as Nash µ∗ is predetermined by L(φ, ω). We
propose to use a neural network mediator agentM that perturbs the original dynamic of the game
by introducing auxiliary codes to players. We will show that a proper reward forM can be set to
µ∗µt+3
µt+2
µt+1
µtDKL(µ
∗||µt) = k
M(.) = ct+1
M(.) = ct+2
M(.) = ct+3
Figure 4: FTNPL scheme: ∀µt on the same orbit, DKL(µ∗||µt) = k. MediatorM minimizes DKL(µ∗||µt)
by learning from reward term defined in eq. 4.
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maximize Nash entropy H(µ∗) under the new perturbed game. However, without a game-theoretic
formulation, players will ignore these perturbations. To address this, we use our predefined notion
of MeMCorEq. The derivation MeMCorEq in our setup is not straightforward, as mediatorM is
perturbing the game dynamics sequentially as demonstrated in Fig. 4.
Theorem 3. Any zero-sum game will converge to MNE without recurrent dynamics when a me-
diator appends correlated codes c to the inputs of both players according to the following reward
function:
rm = −
T∑
i=0
T∑
j=0
ReLU(gpi(φi, φj , c) + gD(ωi, ωj , c)) (4)
where hT = (µ0..., µT ) is history of strategies of the game up to time T and µt = (φt, ωt),
ReLU(x) = max(x, 0) and g is the marginal payoff gain defined in 2.1.
Proof. Dual problem of MeMCorEq is infλ>=0 ln(Z(λ) with the following relationship between the dual
variables λ and the primal variables µ:
ln(Z(λ)) = − lnEω∼µD [exp(
∑
φ
∑
φˆ
λφ,φˆL(φ, ω)− L(φˆ, ω))]
−Eφ∼µpi [exp(
∑
ω
∑
ωˆ
λω,ωˆL(φ, ω)− L(φ, ωˆ))]
(5)
Instead of learning the Lagrangian multipliers λ, the mediator learns to introduce code c to the loss function
L(φ, ω, c) as if λ is absorbed into the loss function. To make sure that the Lagrangian constraints λ >= 0 are
satisfied, we introduce ReLU function to the equation. This followed by the Jenson inequality yields:
ln(Z(c)) ≤
Eω∼µD [
∑
φ
∑
φˆ
ReLU(L(φˆ, ω, c)− L(φ, ω, c))] + Eφ∼µpi [
∑
ω
∑
ωˆ
ReLU(L(φ, ωˆ, c)− L(φ, ω, c))] =
T∑
i=0
T∑
j=0
ReLU(gpi(φi, φj , c)) +ReLU(gD(ωi, ωj , c))
(6)
The last equality comes from the fact that MeMCorq is a stricter notion than CCE and therefore like other
no-regret learning algorithms, the average of past strategies can be used as a proxy for computing MNE µ∗. The
proof is then complete using the result of Lemma 2 and definition of MeMCorq.
In other words, instead of introducing entropy regularizer h(.) to FTRL, M learns to minimize
DKL(µ
∗||µt) by incentivizing players along the way through augmentation of their observations via
generate codes ct. The loss of the modified game is then L(φt, ωt, ct). We refer to such a no-regret
algorithm follow the neurally perturbed leader (FTNPL) since it can be viewed as FTPL with a neural
network agentM as an oracle. The scheme of FTNPL is visualized in Fig. 4.
3.1 FTNPL Implementation
The description of the algorithm is given in 1. At every time step, the mediator uses the available
information in the game It to generate correlated codes ct. I can take the form of pair of latest
strategies of the games (φ, ω) (in the case of games), pair of observations and actions (s, a) (in
the case of imitation learning) or the real data in the form of generative networks. Both players
update their parameters using an FTL algorithm. At every step of the game, the mediator updates
its parameters according to the reward function in Eq. 4. In practice, we use the second power of g
instead of ReLU function. We also parameterize the mediator policy using the reparameterization
trick [37]. In the convex case (e.g Ex. 1), mediator action is implemented as the mean of the
parameterized policy distribution. However, in the non-convex case (e.g Ex. 2), mediator actions
have to be random samples from the parameterized policy distribution for the game to converge. For
all the experiments except Fig. 2d, we implemented the mediator action as random samples rather
than mean.
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Algorithm 1 Follow the Neurally-Perturbed Leader (FTNPL)
Input:. Code size C, queue size K.
Initialize: Initial parameters (φ0, ω0, ψ0) for agent pi, discriminator D and mediatorM respectively. Initial
observable information in the game I0, empty queues of size K hD = hpi = ∅, hpi .insert(φ0), hD .insert(ω0),
uD = [],upi = []
for i = 0, 1, 2, ... do
ci =Mψi(Ii)
for φ ∈ hpi do
upi.append(L(φi, ωi, ci))
end for
φi+1 ← ∇φi
∑
upi
for ω ∈ hD do
uD.append(−L(φi, ωi, ci))
end for
ωi+1 ← ∇ωi
∑
uD
ψi+1 ← −∇ψi Eˆχi logMψi(Ii)rm(uD,upi) with rm defined in eq. 4
hpi .insert(φi+1), hD .insert(ωi+1), upi = [], uD = [],
end for
(a) GAN training dynamic applied to
celebrity data.
(b) FTNPL-GAN training dynamic
applied to celebrity data.
(c) Inception scores after 25 epochs.
(d) Generated images after 25
epochs.
Figure 5: FTNPL applied to GAN.
In practice, we keep the queue size K small since runtime and memory of FTNPL algorithm
grow linearly with K. Unlike [18], FTNPL requires no special queuing update. Thanks to the
theoretical guarantees of FTNPL, none of the previous GAN training hacks such as choices of entropy
regularization, grad penalty, or parameter clipping for the discriminator is required. FTNPL removes
the recurrent dynamics as well as difficulties of past training methodologies.
4 Applications
We chose K = 5 and a code-size of C = 2 for all the experiments. Note that correlated codes
intuitively represent the Lagrangians of the optimization problem for both players and therefore
C = 2 is a suitable choice.
4.1 Matching Pennies Game
We applied FTNPL to example 1 and 2 with I being the pair of latest strategies of the games (φ, ω).
It converges to MNE µ∗ in both cases. The training dynamics do not exhibit recurrent dynamics as
shown in Fig. 2d and converges to MNE even under non-convex losses as shown in Fig. 3c and Fig.
3d with code size of C = 1 and C = 2 respectively.
4.2 Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative adversarial networks (GAN) [1] is a well-known zero-sum deep learning architecture
capable of generating synthetic samples from arbitrary distribution pdata. Player pi gets random noise
z as input and generates synthetic data piφ(z). Player D then assigns scores Dω(piφ(z)). L(φ, ω) is
the Jenson-Shannon distance between piφ(z) and pdata. We applied FTNPL to DCGAN [38] with
I being the real image data. Our experiment using celeb data [39] shows that training dynamic of
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FTNPL is smoother compared with that of DCGAN as demonstrated in Fig. 5b and 5a. We stoped
training for both models after 25 epochs and computed their inception scores [40]. Fig. 5c shows that
FTNPL leads to smaller variance for the inception score. Some generated samples are visualized in
Fig. 5d.
4.3 Adversarial Imitation Learning
Algorithm 2 Correlated Rollout
Input: policy network pi, mediator policy network
M, i = 0, number of steps n, an initial code c0 = 0C
with C the size of codes, initial state-action trajectory
τ = [], initial code trajectory τc = [], environment
env, s0 = env.reset()
Output: state-action trajectory τ , code trajectory
τc.
while not done and i < n do
a = pi(si, ci)
τc.append(ci), τ .append(si, ai)
i+ = 1
si, done = environment(a)
ci =M(si, a)
end while
Training dynamics of generative adversarial imitation learning (GAIL) [5] is more complicated than
GAN. This is because the agent environment is a black box and this makes the optimization objective
to be non-differentiable end-to-end. As a result, proper policy rollouts and Monte-Carlo estimation of
policy gradients are required which makes the training dynamic more complicated. Therefore, the
rest of the experiments are focused on the application of the FTNPL to GAIL. To formally explain
the GAIL let (S,A, P, r , ρ0, γ) be an infinite-horizon, discounted Markov decision process (MDP)
with state-space S , action space A, transition probability distribution P : S ×A× S → R, reward
function r : S → R, distribution of the initial state s0 ρ0 : S → R, the discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1). In
the case of imitation learning, we are given access to a set of expert trajectories τE that are achieved
using expert policy piE . We are interested at estimating a stochastic policy pi : S ×A → [0, 1]. To
estimate piE , GAIL optimizes the following:
min
pi
max
D∈(0,1)S×A
Epi[logD(s, a)] + EpiE [log(1−D(s, a))]− λH(pi) (7)
, with the expected terms defined as Epi[D(s, a)] , E[
∑∞
t=0 γ
tD(st, at)], where s0 ∼ ρ0, at ∼
pi(at|st), st+1 ∼ P (st+1|at, st), and H(pi) , Epi[− log pi(a|s)] is the γ-discounted causal entropy.
An adversary player D tries to distinguish state-action pairs generated during rollout using pi from
the demonstrated trajectories generated by piE . To apply FTNPL Alg. 1 to GAIL, we modify the
rollout algorithm to Alg. 2 with I = (s, a). The concept of adding codes to the policy network is
similar to infoGAIL [4]. InfoGAIL uses fixed code to guide an entire trajectory. Moreover, it uses
other regularization terms in the policy gradient optimization objective, to make sure that the codes
would not be ignored. The correlated codes have different properties. First, they are generated per
state-action (they also are fed into the discriminator) and therefore it addresses the multimodality and
other types of variations within the trajectories as well. Second, there is no need to include any extra
regularization terms including discounted causal entropy, i.e we assume λ = 0 in Eq. 7. Agent pi
uses PPO [42] for updates. We also used the utility definition of Wasserstein GAN [? ] for our final
implementation. The rest is a straightforward application of FTNPL 1 to GAIL. We also apply FTPL
algorithm to GAIL as a baseline.
4.3.1 Expriements
Changing environments When learning from the expert trajectories piE , one has to take into account
the internal factors of variations such as learning in new environments that not are demonstrated in
the expert trajectories. For example, observations can vary for different levels of a game. Using the
CoinRun environment [41], we set up an experiment to show that the introduction of correlated codes
in FTNPL not only can address recurrent dynamic issues but also the internal factors of variations.
CoinRun is a procedurally generated environment that has a configurable number of levels and
difficulty. It can provide insight into an agent’s ability to generalize to new and unseen environments.
The game observations are high dimensional ( 64 × 64 × 3 RGB) and therefore it is also suitable
for testing the efficiency of RL-based mediator of FTNPL under a complex environment. The only
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(a) Coinrun with One level (b) Coinrun with Unbounded levels (c) Pendulum (d) Continuous Mountain Car
Figure 6: FTNPL applied to Imitation Learning.
(a) Expert (b) GAIL (c) FTPL GAIL (d) FTNPL GAIL
Figure 7: Path of trajectories during training: The results are for the last 40K of the overall 200K steps.
reward in the CoinRun environment is obtained by collecting coins, and this reward is a fixed positive
constant. A collision with an obstacle results in the agent’s death and levels vary widely in difficulty.
The level terminates when the agent dies, the coin is collected, or after 1000 time steps. We first
trained a PPO [42] agent using the 3-layer convolutional architecture proposed in [43]. We stopped
the training when it achieved a reward of 6.3 with 500 levels. We then generated expert trajectories
with the same number of levels. However, in imitation learning training, two different number of
levels are selected: one and unbounded set of levels. A higher number of levels decrease the chance
that a given environment gets encountered more than once. For the unbounded number of levels, this
probability is almost 0. The selection of these different numbers of levels provides an insight into the
adaptability and transferability of the imitation algorithms to new environments. We visualized the
performance of FTNPL GAIL and GAIL, averaged over three different seeds. When there is only
one level, the gap between the sample efficiency of GAIL and FTNPL-GAIL is not very wide as
shown in Fig. 6a. However, with the increase in the number of levels (i.e changing environments),
the FTNPL training outperforms GAIL more noticeably as demonstrated in 6b. We also did a few
classic baselines for MountainCarContinuous-v0 in Fig. 6d and pendulum-v0 in Fig. 6c. FTNPL
outperforms the other baselines and also has smaller variances across all the experiments.
Imitating mixture of state-action trajectories Another type of variation in piE is the external
one, such as when one is learning from a mixture of expert demonstrations. For this, we used the
Synthetic 2D-CircleWorld experiment of [4]. The goal is to select direction strategy at time t using
the observations of t− 4 to t such that a path would mimic those demonstrated in expert trajectories
τE . These expert trajectories are stochastic policies that produce circle-like trajectories. They contain
three different modes as shown in Fig. 7. A proper imitation learning should have the ability to
distinguish the mixture of experts from each other. The results in Fig. 7 demonstrate the path of
learned trajectories during the last 40K of the overall 200K steps of training. It can be seen that
FTNPL-GAIL can distinguish the expert trajectories and imitate the demonstrations more efficiently
than FTPL-GAIL and GAIL.
5 Conclusion
We proposed a novel follow the perturbed leader algorithm for training adversarial architectures. The
proposed algorithm guarantees convergence to mixed Nash equilibrium without recurrent dynamics
and the loss-convexity assumption. As demonstrated in our experiments, it is also suitable for training
in environments with various factors of variations thanks to the introduction of correlated codes.
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